Primary source → Jusung Engineering FY2025 사업보고서 (DART, filed 18 March 2026) · KOSDAQ: 036930
A note on what this is and is not: this is a compliance-risk assessment of a publicly researchable Korean equipment maker. It is not a recommendation to buy or sell the stock, and nothing here is investment advice. The point is to show, with one named company’s filings, what U.S. export-control exposure looks like when it lands on top of a commercial decline that is already happening.
A boom that became a case study
Jusung Engineering makes ALD and CVD deposition equipment — the kind of semiconductor tool that, in the AMAT case, sat at the center of a $252.5 million export-control penalty. For a stretch, Jusung’s story was a growth story. According to data providers (PitchBook, EMIS), the China share of Jusung’s revenue climbed from roughly 68% in 2023 to about 85% at its FY2024 peak — a genuine China boom, and one Korean trade press covered as a Q1-2025 profit surge.
Then the boom reversed. Per Jusung’s own DART filing, FY2025 total revenue fell to ₩310.7 billion, down 24.1% from FY2024’s ₩409.4 billion. The geographic mix shifted hard at the same time: overseas revenue, which was 85.4% of the total in FY2024, dropped to 64.6% in FY2025, while domestic (Korean) sales more than doubled their share to 35.4%. The cause was not a regulator. It was the market: Chinese fabs accelerated substitution toward domestic equipment makers (NAURA, AMEC), and a company heavily levered to Chinese demand felt it immediately.
A precision note that matters for credibility: Jusung’s DART filing discloses only a domestic-versus-overseas split (국내/해외) — it does not break out a China-specific revenue line. The ~85% “China” figure is a FY2024-peak number from secondary data providers, closely tracking the filing’s 85.4% overseas figure for that year. Cite it as a dated, attributed FY2024 figure — never as a current China percentage. As of FY2025, overseas is 64.6% and the China-specific slice is undisclosed and, by all indications, declining.
Where the compliance risk enters
Here is the structural point. Jusung is an ALD/CVD equipment maker with deep, if now-shrinking, exposure to Chinese fabs — and it supplies the kind of tool category that U.S. export controls target. Its filings name Samsung, SK Hynix, and Chinese fabs as customers. Whether any specific Chinese customer is a CXMT-tier fab the company does not confirm, and it should be treated as inference rather than a stated relationship.
Now layer the regulatory scenario on top. CXMT — China’s leading DRAM maker — has been publicly reported as under U.S. Entity List consideration, though it was not designated as of May 2026. If a major Chinese memory fab that buys ALD/CVD tools were designated, the license universe for that customer would expand to all U.S.-regulated items, and any U.S.-origin content or U.S.-tooling-derived output in a Korean supplier’s products could become license-gated overnight — the same Foreign Direct Product Rule and Entity List mechanics that the AMAT case turned on.
The crucial framing — and the one that keeps this honest — is sequence. For a company like Jusung, an export-control designation would not initiate the China-revenue loss. The loss is already happening, for commercial reasons, via domestic substitution; the -24.1% is the evidence. A designation would compound an existing decline, not cause a new one. That distinction is what separates a defensible compliance-risk analysis from an alarmist “designation = $0 China revenue overnight” claim, which the facts do not support.
Why this is the cleanest Korean case study
Jusung is useful precisely because everything above is publicly researchable: the revenue figures are in DART; the China-boom narrative is in trade press and data providers; the product category is the one U.S. enforcement already targets; and the commercial decline is documented in the company’s own numbers. You can build the entire risk picture from primary and named secondary sources without speculation.
For a Korean equipment SME reading this about itself rather than about Jusung, the diagnostic is three questions:
- How concentrated is your China revenue, and which direction is it moving? Jusung’s answer — very concentrated, now declining — is the common shape.
- Does U.S.-origin content or U.S.-derived tooling sit in your products? If yes, FDPR and Entity List mechanics can reach your Chinese-bound output regardless of Korean assembly (see the AMAT analysis).
- Is any major Chinese customer a plausible future Entity List candidate? If yes, you are exposed to a step-change you cannot control, layered on a commercial trend you are already living.
The takeaway
The Jusung problem is not “a Korean company is about to be sanctioned.” It is subtler and more general: export dependence and export-control exposure compound each other. A supplier heavily levered to Chinese demand is, by construction, the supplier most exposed to a designation affecting a Chinese customer — at exactly the moment that demand is already eroding for commercial reasons. The companies that map both risks together, with dated figures and honest sequencing, are the ones that will navigate the next two years. The ones that treat China concentration as a growth story right up until a Federal Register notice are the ones that will not.
Compliance-risk assessment, not investment advice. A Korean-language version follows on Brunch. Part of a series on Korea–China export-control exposure following the AMAT settlement.